the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY, Arlington, VA.

Hon. James E. Risch,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19–24 concerning the Navy's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Germany, through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) acting as its Agent, for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$122.86 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely.

 $\begin{array}{c} {\rm CHARLES~W.~Hooper,}\\ {\it Lieutenant~General,~USA,~Director.} \end{array}$ Enclosures.

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-24

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

- (i) Prospective Purchaser: The Government of Germany through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) acting as its Agent.
 - (ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment* \$105.23 million. Other \$17.63 million.

Total \$122.86 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Up to ninety-one (91) AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) Tactical Missiles.

Up to eight (8) AGM-88E AARGM Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM).

Non-MDE: Also included are up to six (6) telemetry/flight termination systems, Flight Data Recorders (FDR), U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services and miscellaneous support equipment, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Navy.

- (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: GY-P-GLC, GY-P-GLO, GY-P-GPN, GY-P-ALB.
- (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered. or Agreed to be Paid: None.
- (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Annex Attached.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: June 28, 2019.

*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Germany—AGM-88E AARGM Missiles

The Government of Germany has requested to buy, through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) acting as its Agent, up to ninety-one (91) AGM-88E Ad-

vanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) Tactical Missiles, and up to eight (8) AGM-88E AARGM Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM). Also included are up to six (6) telemetry/flight termination systems, Flight Data Recorders (FDR), U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services and miscellaneous support equipment, and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated cost is \$122.86 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO ally, which is an important force for political and economic stability in Europe. It is vital to the U.S. national interests that Germany develops and maintains a strong and ready self-defense capability.

The AGM-88E AARGM is an upgrade to the older generation AGM-88B High-Speed AntiRadiation Missile (HARM), which Germany first purchased in 1988. The AGM-88E AARGMs in this case will be manufactured using a mixture of new components and older sections from Germany's existing stock of AGM-88Bs provided as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). Germany will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and support into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

Germany has requested that the NSPA act as its agent for the FMS procurement and case management to support the AARGM program. The principal U.S. contractor will be NGIS, Ridgecrest, CA. The integration efforts will be via a Direct Commercial Sale (DCS), initiated by the Luftwaffe, between the Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) and the AARGM Original Equipment Manufacturer, Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, formerly known as Orbital ATK (OA). There are no known offset agreements associated with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require five U.S. government personnel and three contractor representatives to travel to Germany to provide Program Management Reviews. Two visits are planned per year over the next five years.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed

TRANSMITTAL NO. 19-24

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) AGM-88E weapon system is an air-to-ground missile intended to suppress or destroy land or sea-based radar emitters associated with enemy air defenses and provides tactical air forces with a lethal countermeasure to enemy radar directed, surface-to-air missiles, and air defense artillery weapons systems. Destruction or suppression of enemy radars denies the enemy the use of air defense systems, thereby improving the survivability of our tactical aircraft. It uses a multimode seeker that incorporates global positioning system/ inertial measurement unit (GPS/IMU) midcourse guidance, a radio frequency (RF) radiation homing receiver, an active millimeter. When assembled, the AGM-88E AARGM is classified SECRET. The AARGM Guidance Section (seeker hardware) and Control Section with the Target Detector is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop counter-

measures that might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

3. A determination has been made that the Government of Germany can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale supports the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives as outlined in the Policy Justification.

4. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to Germany.

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE SECURITY
COOPERATION AGENCY,
Arlington, VA.

Hon. James E. Risch, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19–16 concerning the Air Force's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and Acceptance to the Government of Morocco for defense articles and services estimated to cost \$250.4 million. After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed sale.

Sincerely,

CHARLES W. HOOPER, Lieutenant General, USA, Director.

Enclosures. ${\tt TRANSMITTAL\ NO.\ 19-16}$

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act. as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Morocco.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment \$0 million.

Other \$250.4 million.

Total \$250.4 million.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE): None. Non-MDE: F-16 support equipment, spares and repair parts; personnel training and training equipment; publications and technical documentation; munitions support equipment (for AMRAAM, CMBRE, JDAM, PAVEWAY), support and test equipment; integration and test; U.S. Government and

contractor engineering, technical and logistical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Air Force (MO-D-QAK).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: MO-D-SAY. (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: None.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: June 27, 2019.

As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Morocco—Sustainment for F-16 Fleet

The Government of Morocco has requested a continuation of sustainment support to its current F-16 fleet to include the following non-MDE components: F-16 support equipment, spares and repair parts; personnel training and training equipment; publications and technical documentation; munitions support equipment (for AMRAAM, CMBRE, JDAM, PAVEWAY), support and test equipment; integration and test; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated program cost is \$250.4 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a major Non-NATO ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in North Africa.

The proposed sale will improve Morocco's self-defense capability. Additionally, the continuation of sustainment for their F-16 fleet strengthens the interoperability with the United States and other regional allies. Morocco already operates an F-16 fleet and this sustainment case will ensure that they can continue operating their fleet in the future. Morocco will have no difficulty absorbing this support into its armed forces.

The proposed sale will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Corporation, Bethesda, Maryland. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of additional U.S. Government and/or contractor representatives to Morocco.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, today, I wish to discuss the importance of strengthening the defense industrial base, particularly as it relates to shipbuilding.

On July 21, 2017, the President signed Executive Order 13806, directing the Department of Defense to lead a whole of government assessment of the health of the manufacturing and defense industrial base of the United States. The report was released on October 5, 2018, and outlines current risks in the defense industrial base.

Within the military shipbuilding sector, concerns range from an overreliance on single and sole source sup-

pliers, to a capacity shortfall for maintenance and modernization work, to insufficient competition and unstable demand.

The DoD report said: "Industries involved in the manufacturing of shipbuilding components were among the hardest hit by the global shift in the industrial base over the last 20 years. Of the top ten highest grossing industries in Navy shipbuilding, six are in the manufacturing sector. Since 2000, these industries experienced a combined decline of over 20,500 establishments."

We cannot afford to shrink our military shipbuilding industry any further.

These issues are particularly acute in my State of Virginia. Not only is Virginia home to Newport News Shipbuilding and Norfolk Naval Shipyard, we have hundreds of military shipbuilder suppliers, a number of which are considered by the Department of Defense to be fragile. These companies are essentially national treasures, from Hunt Valve out of Roanoke to Jo-Kell in Chesapeake, KITCO Fiber Optics in Virginia Beach, and Hampton Machine Shop in Newport News.

These companies want stability and predictability in funding; they want to be certain our Nation is serious about a 355-ship Navy.

These are issues that our committee has been working on for some time. In testimony last fall before the Seapower Subcommittee, the Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, James Geurts, told our committee that "advanced funding and anything we can do to help the supplier base will drastically reduce risks going forward. What we are seeing in most of our construction programs as a key risk is supplier fragility, either single sources or single producers where we have to ramp up production."

Chairman Inhofe has paid close attention to those concerns, and I very much appreciate how far this bill goes to address the issues outlined in the industrial base report.

This bill authorizes funds for the third year for the submarine supplier base initiative, which is helping critical suppliers across the Nation; authorizes additional funding along with incremental funding authority for both LPD 31 and LHA 9; accelerates the acquisition of LHA 9; adds funding for advance procurement for the DDG program; and requires DoD to assess the savings a multiyear procurement would yield in the LPD program, and the savings we could achieve through a block buy of two LHA's. The bill also reauthorizes CVN 75, the USS Harry S Truman. It leaves no room for indecision on the future of this asset.

It is critical that the DOD's current and prospective shipbuilding programs, the Virginia class and Columbia class submarine programs, the new Frigate program, destroyers, specifically take action to maintain the domestic supply base and not allow foreign sources to undercut the pricing of the domestic supply base.

We ask the administration to help us in every way to stay focused on helping our military shipbuilding industrial base meet the Navy the Nation Needs.

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND SECURITY AT THE SOUTHERN BORDER ACT

Mr. BOOKER. Mr. President, today I wish to speak about S. 1900, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Humanitarian Assistance and Security at the Southern Border Act. I understand there is some important funding in the bill to deal with President Trump's manufactured crisis at the U.S.-Mexico border, particularly funding for the Department of Health and Human Services. However, I cannot in good conscience support a bill that provides additional resources to the Department of Homeland Security at a time when we are seeing this agency commit so many gross human rights violations. I want to make my position clear: I do not support this bill in its entirety, and I would have voted against it.

Both U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE, and U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, CBP, have already benefited from increased funding in fiscal years 2018 and 2019 and, as we have seen, have used that funding to ramp up their inhumane policies. Policies like "metering", which forces migrants to wait in Mexico for weeks, sometimes months, in order to enter the United States and claim their legal right to asylum. We know that "metering" has resulted in the deaths of families seeking refuge, like Oscar Alberto Martinez and his 23-month-old Valeria just this week. Policies like the zero-tolerance policy, which has separated thousands of children from their families and continues to this day. These policies are unacceptable and do not reflect who we are as Americans. Everyone should be outraged as what is happening at the hand of this administration and DHS.

Just last week Donald Trump tweeted that he would begin ICE deportation raids across the United States. At a time when the Trump administration is claiming that it does not have enough money to deal with the humanitarian crisis at the Southwest border, it is puzzling how DHS has enough resources to conduct large-scale raids all across the United States. How is there money for raids that would terrorize communities yet not enough money for providing soap, blankets, and toothbrushes for children in the government's custody?

Repeatedly, this administration has chosen to implement policies that cost more and are less efficient in order to pursue its extreme immigration agenda. If ICE and CBP are in need of extra funding, then they should implement policies that save money, like further utilizing alternatives to detention, ATDs. The government's own statistics